I've recently finished reading Thomas Ricks new book Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (see books on the right for a link to Amazon) which has confirmed many of my own suspicions about our futile efforts in Iraq.
Ricks uses his command of the facts and access to first-hand sources to argue that the American military invasion of Iraq was flawed from the outset. It was based on slippery intelligence, poor planning, and over-optimistic assumptions about the will of the Iraqi people to embrace the American invasion.
Ricks cites arrogance, lack of leadership and missed opportunities by both the military and the civilian leadership in Washington and Baghdad as the cause for the counter-insurgency. In addition, his primary sources--quoted at length throughout the book--reiterate again and again that the US never had enough troops on the ground to carry out the mission.
Ricks lays blame for this fiasco on the fact there was no post-war plan. American soldiers were sent into combat with no plan what to do once they were finished defeating the Iraqi Army. The planning that had been done was largely ignored as the situation on the ground changed. For the American military, post-Saddam Iraq became an increasing series of blunders.
Once the operation against Saddam's forces was over, the military high command and it's civilian leadership became increasing inept in dealing with post-Saddam Iraq. The administration was convinced the Iraqis would greet US forces as liberators and therefore never planned nor had the military plan for the possibility of a real insurgency. This was the case for many months. In turn, the an ever increasing fracture between these two made the situation worse. Iraqi resentment began to burn as the US bumbled it's way from liberation (the plan) to occupation (the reality).
Ricks also notes that this insurgency grew into something that might have been avoided had the civilian/military leaders acknowledged the fact they were facing it. Ricks points out that their refusal to to admit that they were facing an insurgency led to flawed tactics. For months the military continued to believe they were fighting the remnants of Saddam's army and fought the war accordingly. Ricks, ever the military historian, notes that counter-insurgency must be fought with different tactics. Because it wasn't, American soldier paid with their lives. Soldiers, one of Rick's sources states, always pay for thee mistakes at the top.
Ricks tells his story through the voices of the men and woman involved in the operation. He weaves together the accounts of many sources and quotes them at length. From planning deficiencies to Abeu Ghraib, Ricks permits them to tell it from their perspective.
Ricks is the Washington Post's senior Pentagon correspondent and has covered the military since 2000. He knows what he's talking about and he had access to many sources for his book. He is well-versed in strategy and tactics and therefore approaches his subject matter in the spirit of an after action review.
Here are some of the main point in Rick's account:
- There was never a public debate about the merits of going to war in Iraq.
- The administration justified the war on several mistaken and delusional premises: non-existent Weapons of Mass Destruction and a best case scenario where the the Iraqis would greet us as liberators and a new free and democratic regime would be in place quickly.
- A clear strategy for the war was never in place. The post-war planning was largely ignored. Ricks identifies a code of silence that seems to have taken hold in the war planning. Military leaders were not frank with their civilian leaders. It's a classic case of over-promising and under-delivering.
- Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz are the chief culprits behind this bumbling effort.
- The insurgency took root as a direct result of US actions immediately after the fall of Saddam's regime because: A) A lack of clear leadership in the post-war Iraq including the absence of post-war planning. B) Leadership blunders, primarily Paul Bremer's dissolution of the Iraqi Army. C) The ineptness of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) D) American mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners and civilians. E) Arrogance of some military commanders in dealing with the civilian population.
One point Ricks seems to ignore--although I might have missed it--is that sheer number of Iraqi civilians casualties suffered as a result of military operations. The present number is in the tens of thousands. Surely, this has contributed to the insurgency.
Ricks devotes the later chapters of his book to identifying the major actions in the war. What is most clear about these many counter-insurgency actions is that there was never a clear strategy for winning in Iraq. Military leaders fought many operations to tactical victory, all the while losing the war.
Tactics, Ricks argues, regardless of their effectiveness, will never win wars. This is the mistake the American military made in Iraq. As a veteran. The military has changed its tactics in Iraq, but, as the last chapter of the book in titled, it may be too little too late.
